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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study examines a monopolist of a base good that benefits from a 
complementary good provided by either it or another firm. Use of the 
complementary good requires the base good, but not the reverse. The model 
assesses and calibrates the extent of the positive influence on the base good 
profits that is created by the existence of the two sources (internal or external) 
of the complementary good. An equivalence between a model of a base and 
complementary good, and a reduced-form model of the base good where 
network effects are assumed in the utility function as a surrogate for the 
presence of direct network effects (i.e., a consumer’s utility directly increases 
in the number of users) or indirect network effects (i.e., arising from 
increased variety of complementary goods produced by other firms) is 
established. This allows us to examine the pricing of the complementary 
good under different market structures and in the context of the effect of 
other complementary goods via the network effects. Additionally, the study 
assesses and calibrates the influence of the intensity of network effects and 
quality improvements in the complementary good on profits from the base 
good. Also evaluated is the incentive that a monopolist has to improve the 
quality of the base good rather than that of a complementary good that it 
produces. 
The model has implications for the base good monopolist’s trade off in 
improving the quality of its own complementary good versus subsidizing 
increases in other network effects. The monopolist could subsidize increases 
in other network effects by, e.g., taking actions to increase sales of the base 
good thereby increasing consumers’ utility directly (direct network effects) or 
facilitating or subsidizing increased variety of other complementary goods 
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available (indirect network effects). The base good monopolist prefers that an 
independent firm offer an additional complementary good rather than 
improve the quality of an extant complementary good by the same amount as 
the quality offered by the new good, assuming the costs of the two are the 
same. This results from the complementary goods firm’s incentive to restrict 
output more at higher quality levels, limiting the increase in base good sales 
via sales of the complementary good. Importantly, the base good monopolist 
gains more from adding an complementary good to its portfolio of products 
than increasing the quality of an existing portfolio product by the same 
quality as that of the new good if the costs of doing so are the same. The 
effect is stronger than if an independent firm produces the complementary 
good. This is because adding a complementary good increases sale of the 
base good because of the complementarities, but an increase in the quality of 
the complementary good does not affect sales of the base good because the 
monopolist can fully adjust the price of the complementary good to capture 
profits from its increased quality. 
The model also has implications for the base good monopolist’s incentives 
to invest in improving the base and complementary goods under different 
market structures and in making them compatible. An independent base good 
monopolist has a greater incentive to invest in improving the quality of the 
base good (at the margin) than a joint monopolist who produces both the base 
and complementary good. Improvements in the base good increase its price 
and therefore the effective price to use the complementary good. A producer 
of both internalizes this and has less incentive to improve the base good, 
while an independent monopolist does not. Conversely, a monopolist who 
produces both the base and complementary goods has a greater incentive to 
improve the complementary good (on the margin) than an independent firm 
would have to improve it. Improvements in the complementary good’s 
quality increase sales of the base good, which the joint monopolist 
internalizes but the independent firm does not. Finally, if a single firm owns 
both the base and complementary goods it has a greater incentive to make 
them compatible than if separate firms offered the two products because 
increasing compatibility improves sales of both. The base good benefits 
directly from a more compatible product and the complementary good 
benefits indirectly because it requires purchase of the base good. A joint 
monopolist internalizes this feedback while independent firms do not. 
Based on these results, a possible explanation of the fact that Microsoft 
Office is significantly more expensive than Microsoft Windows is discussed. 
Microsoft has approximately the same market share (over 90 per cent) in the 
market for operating systems for personal computers as in the market for 
‘Office applications’ (a bundle of word processing, spreadsheet, presentation 
and database software). However, Microsoft charges a price for its Windows 
operating system that is significantly lower than the price of its office suite. 
Although the model does not address the level of prices for Windows and 
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Office, it can explain this difference in relative prices for Windows and 
Office. A joint monopolist, such as Microsoft, has two price instruments, the 
base good and complementary good price. It is optimal to keep the operating 
system price low even if Office is quite valuable because some users buy 
Windows for use with other complementary goods. Raising the price of 
Office but keeping the price of Windows low allows the joint monopolist to 
capture some of the value provided by Office while not pricing users of other 
goods complementary to Windows out of the market. 
The model of a base and a complementary good is similar to models of 
‘mix and match,’ where consumers assemble systems in fixed proportions, 
but differs from typical assumptions in these models because the base good in 
the model is valuable without use of the complementary good. In mix and 
match models typically neither good is valuable without the other. Mix and 
match models originated from Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides 
(1989).1, 2 
The reduced-form model of the base good in which network effects are 
summarized by a term that influences utility positively and is increasing in 
sales, derives from Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1986). 
The network effects summarized in the utility function can result from either 
direct or indirect network effects. In the former case, a consumer benefits 
directly from the number of individuals adopting the base good (e.g., because 
there is a larger network to exchange files with) while in the latter case a 
consumer benefits indirectly from the number of individuals adopting the 
base good through the increased availability of software variety. Both of 
these effects are summarized by a term in consumers’ utility functions, which 
is increasing in total sales of the base good.3 
There has been little attempt to calibrate the size of the network effect 
used in reduced-form models. Exceptions are Economides (1996b) and 
Clements (2004). Economides (1996b) calibrates the size of the network 
effect in the context of measuring the incentive of a patent-holding 
monopolist who also sells a complementary good to invite competitors in the 
complementary goods market so as to maximize the network effects. 
Clements (2004) evaluates the effect of the strength of network effects, 
degree of compatibility and the density of consumers in the market on 
standardization under oligopolistic competition. The objective of these papers 
is different from our objective of providing an equivalence of these modelling 
approaches and evaluating the incentives of the base good provider to 
innovate, promote other complementary products and set compatibility 
standards. 
The rest of this chapter starts by setting up the basic framework of the 
research. The five models used are then developed and discussed. These 
models differ in the way that network effects and inherent product quality are 
modelled. The equilibria of these models is then considered. A discussion of 
the incentives to invest in quality in either the base good or the 
160 Regulation and performance of communication and information networks 
 
complementary good in different ownership structures and under different 
intensities of network effects follows and compatibility decisions made by 
the base good monopolist are examined. Next, there is a discussion of the 
explanation of Microsoft’s relative pricing provided by the analysis. To 
conclude, the results are compared with the empirical literature on network 
effects. 
 
 
BASIC FRAMEWORK 
 
Assume that consumers are differentiated by their preferences for quality of 
the base good (B) and quality of the complementary good (C). The second 
good requires the first good to provide positive utility.4 For example, think of 
the Windows operating system as the base good, and an office suite (such as 
Microsoft Office) as the complementary good, not necessarily produced by 
the same company. Let the marginal utility of quality of the base good be   
and the marginal utility of quality of the complementary good be  . The pair 
( , )   defines a consumer type. Also, assume that both   and   are 
distributed independently and uniformly on [0, 1]. 
Assumed network effects could be direct effects that result from a 
consumer’s utility directly increasing in the number of other users of the base 
good or indirect effects that result from other complementary goods whose 
existence positively influences consumers’ willingness to pay for the base 
good via economies of scale in production. Assume for this study the latter 
case that the positive consumption effects between the base good and the 
complementary goods reinforce each other. These effects are summarized by 
adding a term proportional to sales of the base good in the utility function of 
a typical consumer. 
When consuming one unit of the base good and possibly one unit of the 
complementary good, consumer ( , )   receive utility 
 
B B BU q p x V      ,  
 
where Bq  is the quality of the base good, Bp  is the price of the base good, 
V  is the utility from the consumption of the complementary good, Bx  is the 
sales of the base good,   measures the intensity of the network effects and 
  is an indicator variable taking the value one if the complementary good is 
bought and zero otherwise. Thus, network effects arising out of direct or 
indirect network effects are summarized by an additive term in the utility 
function proportional to sales.5 Consumers not purchasing receive zero 
utility. The utility from the consumption of the complementary good is 
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C CV q p  ,  
 
where Cq  is the quality of the complementary good and Cp  is the price of 
the complementary good. 
The first model has a base good monopolist in a market where network 
effects are summarized in the utility function of consumers as proportional to 
sales. The second model has two monopolists (independent firms), one for 
the base good and one for the complementary good, and assumes no network 
effects. The third model adds network effects to the independent firms in 
Model 2. The fourth model has a single monopolist (joint monopolist) 
producing both the base and the complementary good. The fifth model adds 
network effects to the joint monopolist considered in Model 4. 
 
 
MODELS 
 
Model 1: Single Good Monopolist in a Market with Network Effects 
 
First consider a model of a single good monopolist selling the base good with 
network effects arising from direct or indirect effects due to the presence of 
other complementary goods produced with increasing returns to scale. In this 
case, 0   and consumer   who buys one unit of the base good of quality 
Bq  at price Bp  receives utility of 
 
B B BU q p x    , (7.1) 
 
where 0   measures the intensity of the network effect (marginal utility of 
network expansion). All consumers of type B   buy the good, where the 
marginal consumer is  
 
( )B B
B
B
p x
q
  . (7.2) 
 
Sales are 
 
( )
(1 ) 1 B BB B
B
p xx
q
     . (7.3) 
 
Inverting the demand gives 
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( ) ( ),
( ) ( )
B B B B B
B B B B
B B
q p p q px p x
q q
 
     .
6 (7.4) 
 
Assuming zero costs, maximizing profits implies:7 
 
,
2 2( )
B B
B B
B
q qp x
q 
     and 
2
4( )
B
B
B
q
q
 
   .
8 (7.5) 
 
In the case of no network effects, i.e., when 0  , the demand without 
network effects is a pivot of the demand with network effects through the 
point (0, )Bq . It is well known that such pivots of linear demands lead to the 
same monopoly price. Thus, the equilibrium price is unaffected by network 
effects, while sales and profits are higher with them. Using the subscript 0 for 
the variables with no networks effects ( 0)  , gives 
 
  *0 0;* BB B B BB
qx x p p
q α
     
, and 0 ( )
B
B B
B
q
q α 
      . (7.6) 
 
Model 2: Independent Firms without Network Effects 
 
This model considers two independent monopolists, one for the base good 
and another for the complementary good, and no network effects are allowed. 
Comparing the equilibrium of Model 2 to that of Model 1, enables calibration 
of the intensity of network effects necessary to generate base good profits 
equivalent to those generated by sales of a complementary good. 
There are two groups of purchasers to consider (see Figure 7.1). First, 
consumers of type B  , ,B BU   buy the base good only, where B  is 
the marginal consumer indifferent between buying the base good and buying 
nothing, i.e. 
 
B B Bp q  , (7.7) 
 
and ,B BU  is the marginal consumer indifferent between buying only the base 
good and buying both the base and complementary goods, i.e. 
 
,B BU C Cp q  . (7.8) 
 
Second, consumers of types ,B BU  , B  , as well as of types 
( )BU   , B  , buy both, where ( )BU   is the marginal consumer of 
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Figure 7.1 
 
type   indifferent between buying both goods and buying nothing, i.e. 
 
( ) ( )BU B C B Cp p q q     . (7.9) 
 
The profits for the base good monopolist are 
 
 , , ,(1 ) 1 ( 2B B B BU B BU BU B BU Bp             , (7.10) 
 
where ( ) /BU B C Cp p q    is the consumer of type 0   who is indifferent 
between buying both goods and nothing. The profits for the complementary 
good monopolist are 
 
, ,(1 ) ( ) 2C B BU BU B BU B Cp          . (7.11) 
 
At the Nash equilibrium in a price-setting game, the first-order conditions 
for the two monopolists are 
 
(3 4 ) 2 0B B C B Cp p p q q    and 2 2 ( 2 ) 0B B C Cp q q p   . (7.12) 
 
 
Purchase Base 
and Complementary 
Goods
No 
Purchase 
Purchase 
Base 
Good 
Only 
1 
1 
B 0 
0 
BUB, 
    BU 
BU  
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Since the first-order conditions are nonlinear they are solved numerically 
to find the equilibrium.9 The analysis restricts C Bq q  since only interior 
solutions only and for C Bq q , 1BU   are considered.10 
 
Model 3: Independent Firms with Network Effects 
 
In Model 3, we incorporate network effects arising from direct consumption 
externalities or other complementary goods into Model 2. The utility function 
of consumers (eq. 8.1) now has a positive   capturing the network effects. 
The same regions of consumer types buy as in Model 2, but some margins 
now depend on  . We use superscript n  to denote the presence of network 
effects 
 
, ,( ) ,
n n
B B B B B BU B BUp x q      , (7.13) 
 
( ) , ( )n nBU B C B B C BU B C B Cp p q x q p p x q           . (7.14) 
 
Demand for the base good is given by solving for Bx  in 
  ,1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) / 2n n n nB B B BU B B BU B Bx x x x           . (7.15) 
 
Since nB  and nBU  are both linear functions of Bx , this is a quadratic 
equation. Using the positive root, Bx
 , that solves this equation, the profit 
function for the base good monopolist is 
 
    , , ,1 ( ) 1 1 2 ( ) ( )n n n n n n nB B B B BU B BU BU B B BU B B Bx x x p                  (7.16)
 
and for the complementary good monopolist is 
  . ,(1 ) 1 2 ( ) ( )n n n n nC B BU BU B B BU B B Cx x p             (7.17) 
 
The first-order conditions for the two firms are nonlinear functions of the 
prices and so are solved numerically.11 
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Model 4: Joint Monopolist without Network Effects 
 
In Model 4, the joint monopolist sells both the base and complementary 
goods. The marginal consumers are defined in the same manner as in Model 
2, and the profit function for the joint monopolist is 
 
  
,
, ,
(1 )
1 1 2 ( )
B C B B BU B
B BU BU B BU B B C
p
p p
   
   
  
      (7.18)
 
The joint monopolist chooses both prices to maximize its profits. The first-
order conditions are 
 
3 ( 2 ) 2 0B B C B Cp p p q q    and 23 2 ( 2 ) 0B B C Cp q q p   . (7.19) 
 
These can be solved to get the equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits: 
 
2 ,
3 2 3
CB B
B C
qq qp p   , (7.20) 
 
( 2 )
1
(2 )
B B C
B
B C
p p px
q q
   and 
2( 2 )
1
(2 )
B C B
C
B C
p p qx
q q
  .12 (7.21) 
 
Notice that the price of the base good is independent of the quality of the 
complementary good. This is true for general demand functions, since the 
marginal revenue of the joint monopolist from sales of the base good is 
independent of the quality and price of the complementary good, at the 
optimal complementary good price. To see this, consider general demand 
functions for the base and complementary goods, ( )B BD p  and ( )C B CD p p  
respectively. Then profits are: 
 
 ( ) ( )B B B B C B Cp D p D p p     and ( )C C C B Cp D p p   , (7.22) 
 
and joint profits are B C     so that the first-order conditions are 
(where primes denote derivatives): 
 
( ) 0B B B C B C CD p D D p p D      , 
( ) 0C B C CD p p D   . (7.23) 
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These conditions imply that ( ) ( ) 0B B B B BD p p D p  . Therefore, for the 
joint monopolist the choice of price for the base good is independent of the 
choice of price and quality of the complementary good. 
The joint monopolist completely internalizes in the complementary good 
price any changes in the quality of the complementary good, and therefore 
the price of the basic good remains unaffected by such quality changes.13 In 
the analysis only positive prices are considered for the complementary good 
and therefore restrict 2 / 3C Bq q .14 
 
Model 5: Joint Monopolist with Network Effects 
 
Model 5 incorporates network effects for the base good into Model 4. The 
marginal consumers are defined in the same manner as in Model 3 and the 
profit function for the joint monopolist is  
 
  
      
,
, ,
1
11
2
n n n n
B C B B B BU B
n n n n
B BU BU B B BU B B B C
x p
x x p p
   
   

 
  
        .
 (7.24) 
 
The first-order conditions for the firm are nonlinear functions of the prices 
and are solved numerically.15 
 
 
EQUIVALENCE RESULTS 
 
In this section, the size of network effects necessary to achieve the same base 
good profits as those arising from sales of the complementary good are 
calibrated. This is possible since the models explicitly allow for positive 
effects of the complementary good sales as well as models that allow for 
network effects that are summarized in the utility function. Thus, establishing 
equivalence between the network effects (defined as added profits to a base 
good monopolist) created by the presence of a complementary good and 
those summarized in the utility function is done for the various industry 
structures and for quality levels. This equivalence is used in base good profits 
to analyse the incentive of the base good monopolist to offer its own 
complementary good, improve the quality of a complementary good that it 
offers, and subsidize an independent firm so that it offers or increases the 
quality of a complementary good it provides. 
The focus is on a particular type of equivalence, in base good profits, 
because the primary interest is in the incentives of the base good monopolist. 
This equivalence, of course, does not ensure that consumer welfare is 
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equated. Doing so requires determining how to weight the utility of 
consumers with high versus low valuations of base and complementary goods 
since purchasing patterns vary across different equilibria. In addition, profits 
could not be equilibrated at the same time as consumer welfare. One could 
also calibrate equivalence in total profits across both firms. However, this is 
an inappropriate comparison to make when comparing models with and 
without network effects. Similarly, calibrating the equivalence in total (base 
and complementary good) profits for the base good monopolist is 
inappropriate when comparing models in which the base good firm controls 
the complementary good to those in which it does not. Accordingly, the focus 
is on equivalence in base good profits as the goal is to evaluate the incentives 
of the base good monopolist.16 
An important property of all the models is scalability. It is easy to check 
that the equilibrium sales Bx  and Cx  are unaffected by a common scaling (up 
or down) of Bq , Cq , and   by the same coefficient 0  . Additionally, the 
equilibrium prices Bp  and Cp  are proportional to the common scaling factor 
  of Bq , Cq , and  , and therefore their ratio ( / )C Bp p  is unaffected by 
scaling. It follows that equilibrium profits are also proportional in the scaling 
factor  . Thus, all variables are scaled (normalized) in terms of the quality 
of the base good Bq , defining the normalized quality of the complementary 
good as /C C Bq q q , the normalized   or normalized network effects as 
/ Bq  , the normalized prices of the goods as / , /B B B C C Bp p q p p q   , 
the normalized relative price of the complementary good in relation to the 
base good as / /CB C B C BR p p p p    , the normalized base good profits as 
/B B Bq  , and the normalized complementary good profits as 
/C C Bq  . All normalized variables remain unaffected by the common 
scaling of Bq , Cq , and  . Below, are reported results for all models in terms 
of normalized variables. 
 
Equivalence of Network and Complementary Good Effects Produced by 
an Independent Firm 
 
The demonstration begins with a model of two independent monopolists, one 
producing the base good and another producing a complementary good 
(Model 2). This situation is compared with a model of a single base good 
monopolist with network effects summarized in their utility function (Model 
1). Equivalence between the two models is established by equating the 
normalized base good equilibrium profits. An independent firm selling the 
complementary good results in increased sales of the base good. The 
equivalence finds the network effects ( )x  in the utility of individual 
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consumers, where   measures the intensity of the network effect necessary 
to equate base good profits. 
 
Table 7.1 Independent firms: Equivalence of quality and network effects 
 
Normalized 
Complementary Good 
Quality  
 /C C Bq q q  
Normalized Relative 
Complementary Good 
Price  
 /CB C BR p p
 
Normalized Base 
Good Profits  
 
 /B B Bq    
Normalized 
Equivalent    
 
 / Bq   
    
1 0.7071 0.3431 0.2714 
2 1.2291 0.4003 0.3755 
3 1.7375 0.4273 0.4149 
5 2.7441 0.4532 0.4484 
10 5.2481 0.4755 0.4743 
Notes: (a) in this and all subsequent tables, results are to 4 d.p. unless otherwise noted. (b) these 
are equilibrium prices under presence of the complementary good but no network effects. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the normalized network effects,  , required to obtain 
equivalent normalized base good profits in the absence of the complementary 
good. For example, line three of the table indicates that a base good 
monopolist in the absence of a complementary good but with an   of 0.4149 
earns the same normalized base good profits as a base good monopolist with 
an   of zero in the presence of an independent monopolist producing a 
complementary good of normalized quality 3Cq  . In this and all following 
analyses C Bq q  is chosen to ensure an interior solution for the independent 
firms market structure and to ensure a positive price for the complementary 
good in the joint monopolist market structure as described earlier. 
 
Equivalence of Network and Complementary Effect Good Produced by a 
Joint Monopolist 
 
The base good sales of the joint monopolist increase when it also sells the 
complementary good. Normalized network effects,  , are required to obtain 
equivalent normalized base good profits by a monopolist providing only the 
base good. The results are summarized in Table 7.2. This is equivalent to 
Table 7.1 but for a joint monopolist rather than for two independent firms. 
For example, line three of the table indicates that a monopolist producing a 
base good in the absence of a complementary good with an   of 0.4375 
earns the same normalized base good profits as a monopolist selling a base 
and a complementary good of normalized quality 3Cq   with an   of zero. 
The results in Table 7.2 are presented in numerical form for easy  
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Table  7.2 Joint monopolist: Equivalence of quality and network effects 
 
Normalized 
Complementary Good 
Quality  
 /C C Bq q q  
Normalized Relative 
Complementary Good 
Price  
 /CB C BR p p
 
Normalized Base 
Good Profits 
 
 /B B Bq    
Normalized 
Equivalent   
 
 / Bq   
    
1 0.2500 0.4444 0.4375 
2 1.0000 0.4444 0.4375 
3 1.7500 0.4444 0.4375 
5 3.2500 0.4444 0.4375 
10 7.0000 0.4444 0.4375 
Note: These are equilibrium prices under presence of complementary good but no network 
effects. 
 
comparisons with other tables. They can also be presented in algebraic form 
using equations (7.20) and (7.21) as: 3 / 4 1/ 2CB CR q    and 4 / 9B  . 
Equating B  to the normalized base good profits from Model 1 (single good 
monopolist with network effects) gives (from equation 8.5) the equivalent   
of 7 /16  . 
Comparing Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, we observe that, while normalized 
base good profits are sensitive to the normalized quality of the 
complementary good for the independent monopolist, they are not for the 
joint monopolist. For the joint monopolist, all the variation in the normalized 
quality of the complementary good is reflected in the normalized 
complementary good price and the normalized base good price is unaffected 
(i.e., 2 / 3Bp   while ( / 2) 1/ 3C Cp q   ).17 This follows from the fact that 
the joint monopolist is able to adjust the price of the complementary good to 
fully reflect its adjustment in quality. Since it has both price instruments 
available, the joint monopolist can adjust the complementary good price so 
that the margin for consumers buying only the base good (the B  margin in 
Figure 7.1) is not distorted by the change in complementary good quality. 
The joint monopolist does not want to alter the base good price because 
consumers who buy only the base good may be priced out of the market since 
they do not benefit from complementary good quality improvements. In 
contrast, the independent monopolist of the base good, in a Nash equilibrium 
framework, changes its price in the direction of changes in the quality of the 
complementary good. Thus, base good prices and profits are sensitive to 
quality changes of the complementary good when independent firms produce 
the two goods separately but not when the same firm produces them. As a 
result, the strength of the network effects (as measured by the   needed to 
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equate the normalized base good profits) is not sensitive to changes in the 
normalized quality for the joint monopolist but is for the equilibrium of 
independent firms.18 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 are used to assess the base good monopolist’s 
incentive to invest in improving the quality of the complementary good when 
it owns the complementary good versus when an independent firm owns it. 
Microsoft in effect subsidizes compatible applications that it does not sell by 
including in Windows various functions that are useful to applications 
developers and which applications developers would have to develop by 
themselves if they were not available in Windows.19 As noted, the base good 
monopolist does not benefit (in terms of base good profits) from 
improvements in the complementary good quality when it owns both 
products, but does when an independent firm controls the complementary 
good. Therefore, the base good monopolist has a greater incentive to invest in 
improving the complementary good when an independent firm controls it. Of 
course, as a joint monopolist, there might be separate incentives provided by 
the complementary good profits that it would benefit from. 
 
Equivalence of Low-Quality Good with Network Effects and a High-
Quality Good for an Independent Firm 
 
Next the effect of increasing the normalized quality of the complementary 
good when independent firms produce the base and complementary goods is 
analysed. An increase in the degree of normalized network effects equivalent 
to an increase in the normalized quality of the complementary good is found. 
In particular, increases in the normalized quality of the complementary good 
in Model 2 are compared to an increase in normalized network effects (an 
increase in   from 0) in Model 3 with a fixed normalized quality of 1Cq  . 
In Table 7.3, e.g., line three considers a base good monopolist in the presence 
of an independent complementary good monopolist with normalized relative 
quality 1Cq  . If the normalized quality of the complementary good is 
increased to 5Cq   this is equivalent (in normalized base good profits) to 
increasing   from zero to 0.2792. 
These results can be used to assess the incentive of the base good 
monopolist to subsidize an increase in the quality of an independent firm’s 
complementary good versus subsidizing an additional complementary good 
offered by an independent firm. As shown, an independent monopolist who 
produces the base good has normalized profits of 1 / 4  when there is no 
complementary good and no network effects (Model 1). So an independent 
monopolist producing a base good in the absence of a complementary good 
and with no network effects earns normalized base good profits of 0.25. From 
row one of Table 7.1 a base good monopolist in the presence of an 
independent complementary good monopolist offering normalized 
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Table  7.3 Equivalence of quality increase and network effect, independent 
    firms 
 
Increase in 
Normalized 
Complementary Good 
Quality  
 /C C Bq q q  
Normalized Relative 
of Complementary 
Good Price 
(High Quality) 
 /CB C BR p p
 
Normalized Base 
Good Profits 
(High Quality) 
 
 /B B Bq    
Equivalent Increase in 
Normalized   
 
 
 / Bq   
    
1  2 1.2291 0.4003 0.1591 
1  3 1.7375 0.4273 0.2230 
1  5 2.7441 0.4532 0.2792 
1  10 5.2481 0.4755 0.3242 
Notes: These are equilibrium prices and profits under the higher normalized complementary 
good quality. 
 
complementary good quality 1Cq   earns base good profits of 0.3431. Thus, 
adding one complementary good of quality 1Cq   increases normalized base 
good profits by approximately 0.0931. This is larger than the normalized base 
good profits increase precipitated by a normalized quality increase from 
1Cq   to 2 in the complementary good (which, by comparing the base good 
profits in row one of Table 7.3 to base good profits in row one of Table 7.1, 
is approximately 0.0572). 
Thus, a monopolist of the base good prefers that the independent firm add 
a complementary good of normalized quality 1 rather than increase the 
normalized quality of a complementary good from 1 to 2 if the costs of both 
changes are the same. Adding a complementary good expands the market for 
the base good more than an equivalent increase in the normalized quality of 
the complementary good increases the market for the base good because the 
elasticity of demand for the complementary good is declining in its quality so 
that the producer of the complementary good restricts output more per 
incremental increase in quality as the quality rises. This can be seen by 
computing the elasticity of demand for the complementary good from (7.11), 
which yields / ( 0.5 )C C C B Bp q p p   .20 Demand for the complementary 
good becomes more inelastic at higher quality levels because the market 
becomes saturated. Thus at increasingly higher quality levels of the 
complementary good, the complementary good firm restricts output more and 
the base good monopolist benefits less from market expansion of the base 
good. The complementary goods firm does not internalize the profits from 
the market expansion of the base good and at increasingly higher quality 
levels the market for the complementary good becomes saturated (the 
marginal consumer approaches 0  ) so it is optimal to raise price and limit 
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output. This would imply that Microsoft prefers to subsidize a greater number 
of applications that are independent goods with respect to each other (neither 
substitutes nor complements to each other) but are complementary goods to 
its Windows operating system (base good) rather than a few such 
applications of higher quality. 
 
Equivalence of a Low-Quality Good with Network Effects and a High-
Quality Good for a Joint Monopolist 
 
Next, the effect of increasing the normalized quality of the complementary 
good when a joint monopolist produces the base and complementary goods is 
analysed. Increases in the normalized quality in Model 4 are compared to 
increases in normalized network effects (an increase in  , starting from 0) in 
Model 5 with fixed normalized quality equal to 1Cq  . The results are 
reported in Table 7.4. For example, row three of Table 7.4 considers a joint 
monopolist producing base and complementary goods of normalized quality 
1Cq  . If the normalized quality of the complementary good is increased to 
5Cq   no increase in   is required to maintain the same normalized base 
good profits. The base good profits are invariant to the complementary good 
quality. As noted earlier, the joint monopolist can adjust the price of the 
complementary good to fully reflect changes in its quality so it does not need 
to change the base good price. The zero   increases in Table 7.4 mean that 
the joint monopolist does not get any benefits in its normalized base good 
profits from increases in the normalized quality of the complementary good 
that it produces. 
Comparing Table 7.3 and Table 7.4, we observe that normalized profits 
for the base good are sensitive to improvements in the normalized quality of 
the complementary good for the independent firms but not for the joint 
monopolist. As discussed earlier, this follows from the fact that the joint 
monopolist is able to adjust the price of the complementary good to fully 
reflect its change in quality. In contrast, the independent monopolist of the 
base good, at the Nash equilibrium, changes its price in the direction of 
changes in the quality of the complementary good. Thus, to improve base 
good profits the joint monopolist should subsidize independent 
complementary goods but not its own, whilst an independent firm producing 
the base good benefits from both. 
Table 7.2 and Table 7.4 can also be used to assess the incentive of the joint 
monopolist to invest in increasing the quality of its complementary good 
versus adding a complementary good. From Model 1 a monopolist producing 
only a base good and with no network effects earns normalized base good 
profits of 1 / 4 . So a monopolist producing a base good in the absence of a 
complementary good and with no network effects earns normalized base 
good profits of 0.25. From row one (Table 7.2) a joint monopolist offering a 
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Table 7.4 Equivalence of quality increases and network effects, joint   
     monopolist 
 
Increase in 
Normalized 
Complementary 
Good Quality   /C C Bq q q  
Normalized Relative 
Complementary Good 
Price (High Quality)  
 
 /CB C BR p p  
Normalized Base Good 
Profits (High Quality)  
 
 
 /B B Bq    
Equivalent Increase 
in Normalized   
 
 
 / Bq   
    
1  2 1.0000 0.4444 0.0000 
1  3 1.7500 0.4444 0.0000 
1  5 3.2500 0.4444 0.0000 
1  10 7.0000 0.4444 0.0000 
 
Notes: (a) these are equilibrium prices and profits under the higher normalized complementary 
good quality. (b) increase is from zero. 
 
base good along with a complementary good of normalized quality 1Cq   
earns normalized base good profits of 4 / 9 . Thus, adding one 
complementary good of normalized quality 1Cq   increases normalized base 
good profits by 7 / 36 . From row one of Table 7.4, increasing the normalized 
quality level of the complementary good has no effect on normalized base 
good profits, because the joint monopolist has both price instruments 
available and can adjust the complementary good price optimally without 
distorting the margin for consumers buying only the base good. This implies 
that the joint monopolist has an incentive to add a complementary good of 
minimal quality but not invest in its improvement based on its effect on base 
good profits only.21 
 
 
EFFECT OF QUALITY LEVEL AND NETWORK EFFECTS 
ON PROFITS 
 
An important question frequently posed in the network effects literature 
concerns the incentive to improve the quality of products and how this is 
affected by the presence of complementary goods and network effects. In this 
section the incentive for firms to invest in quality at the margin under 
different market structures (joint monopoly versus independent firms) and 
different levels of network effects are assessed. Although not explicitly 
modelled an investment stage can assess the incentives to invest at the margin 
by considering the marginal effects of quality improvements on base good 
profits. 
174 Regulation and performance of communication and information networks 
 
First, the effect on profits of quality changes in the base and 
complementary goods in the presence of varying levels of network effects is 
assessed. Also contrasted are the effects of quality changes when independent 
firms produce the two products to those when a joint monopolist produces 
both. 
Next, consider the effect of changes in base good quality on the 
normalized base good profits of the base good monopolist with an 
independent monopolist providing a complementary good. The results on 
/B Bd dq  are reported in column 1 of Table 7.5 for different combinations 
of normalized network effects and normalized complementary good quality 
levels.22 
Second, the effect of changes in the complementary good quality on the 
normalized base good profits of the base good monopolist with an 
independent monopolist providing a complementary good is assessed. The 
results on /B Cd dq  are reported in column 2 of Table 7.5. 
Third, the effect of changes in the base good quality on the normalized 
complementary good profits of the complementary good monopolist with an 
independent monopolist providing the base good is assessed. The results on 
/C Bd dq  are reported in column 3 of Table 7.5. 
Fourth, the effect of changes in the complementary good quality on the 
normalized complementary good profits of the complementary good 
monopolist with an independent monopolist providing the base good is 
assessed. The results on /C Cd dq  are reported in column 4 of Table 7.5. 
Fifth, the effect of changes in base good quality on the normalized base 
good profits (Column 5) and normalized complementary good profits 
(Column 7) of the joint monopolist is examined. The total effect of the 
change in base good quality on the joint monopolist is the sum of the two 
columns. 
Sixth, the effect of changes in complementary good quality on the 
normalized base good profits (Column 6) and normalized complementary 
good profits (Column 8) of the joint monopolist is considered. Again, the 
total effect of the change in the complementary good quality on the joint 
monopolist is the sum of the two columns. 
Each row of Table 7.5 provides the effects at a given combination of 
normalized network effects and normalized quality levels. For example, row 
two shows that for an   of zero and 2Cq  , a marginal increase in base 
good quality increases the normalized profits of the independent base good 
monopolist by 0.3270, decreases the normalized profits of the independent 
complementary good monopolist by 0.0571, increases the joint monopolist’s 
normalized base good profits by 0.4444 and decreases the joint monopolist’s 
normalized complementary good profits by -0.1482. At the same level of 
normalized network effects and quality levels, a marginal increase in 
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complementary good quality increases the normalized profits of the 
independent base good monopolist by 0.0366, normalized profits of the 
independent complementary good monopolist by 0.2194, increases the joint 
monopolist’s normalized complementary good profits by 0.2593 and does not 
affect the joint monopolist’s normalized base good profits. 
Note that increasing the quality of the base good decreases normalized 
profits for the complementary good ( / 0C Bd dq  ), when independent 
monopolists produce the two goods. Since the base good is required for 
consumers to value the complementary good, an increase in the base good’s 
quality increases price sufficiently that the complementary good firm’s 
profits are squeezed. Conversely, / 0B Cd dq   when an independent 
monopolist produces the second good. Improving the complementary good 
increases complementary good consumers’ willingness to pay for the base 
good, which complementary good consumers must purchase, thus allowing 
the base good monopolist to increase the price of the base good. Because of 
the increased base good price, the monopolist loses some sales to base-good-
only consumers, but not enough to offset the increased revenues from 
complementary good consumers. 
For the joint monopolist, /C Bd dq  is also negative because the joint 
monopolist finds it optimal to raise the price of the base good sufficiently that 
it sacrifices some sales of the complementary good because some potential 
consumers find it too expensive to buy along with the base good. The results 
for /B Cd dq  differ from that for independent firms. When 0   base 
good profits are unaffected by changes in Cq  because the joint monopolist 
has two price instruments and can adjust Cp  without pricing any base-good 
only customers out of the market. When 0  , otherwise, / 0C Bd dq   
because the joint monopolist does not have two prices it can set 
independently. The two prices are linked through the network effects. Each 
base good customer cares about how many other consumers buy the base 
good (the network effects) and buyers of the complementary good must also 
buy the base good affecting its installed base. As a result, adjusting Cp  
affects Bx  through  . 
Comparing columns 1 with 5 and 7 of Table 7.5, increases in the quality of 
the base good have a smaller positive effect on the total (base and 
complementary good) normalized profits of the joint monopolist than on the 
normalized profits of the base good monopolist when there are independent 
monopolists. Thus, an independent base good monopolist has a greater 
marginal incentive to improve the base good than a joint monopolist. This is 
because the independent monopolist does not internalize the negative effect 
that a higher base good price has on the profits of the complementary good 
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(as reflected in the negative values of /C Bd dq  in column 3), while the 
joint monopolist does (as reflected in the negative values of /C Bd dq  in 
column 7). 
Comparing columns 4 with 6 and 8 of Table 7.5, increases in the quality of 
the complementary good have a greater positive effect on the total (base and 
complementary good) normalized profits of the joint monopolist than on the 
normalized profits of the complementary good monopolist when there are 
independent monopolists. Thus, the joint monopolist has a greater marginal 
incentive to improve the complementary good than an independent 
monopolist selling the complementary good in the presence of an 
independent base good monopolist. This is because the joint monopolist can 
adjust the complementary good price fully (partially) to reflect the 
complementary good quality increase without affecting sales of the base good 
(as much) when 0   ( 0  ). The independent complementary good 
monopolist, on the other hand, has to share some of the benefits of the 
complementary good improvement with the independent base good 
monopolist as reflected in the positive values of /B Cd dq  in column 2. 
Also, note that / /B B C Bd dq d dq    is greater for the joint monopolist 
than for the independent firms, which means that the effect on the joint 
monopolist’s normalized profits from an increase in the base good quality is 
greater than the effect on the combined normalized profits of the independent 
firms. This is because the joint monopolist is better able to capture the 
benefits of increasing the base good quality by adjusting the complementary 
good price optimally.  
The model can be used to assess the marginal incentive to increase 
compatibility between the base good and complementary goods. Firms in 
markets with network effects, like software, often face decisions about the 
degree to which their product should be made compatible with other products 
or conform to industry standards. In our model, this is equivalent to 
determining the effect on profits of an increase in normalized network effects 
( ). Comparing this incentive at different normalized quality levels and for 
different market structures (independent firms versus a joint monopolist) 
shows the effect of increasing network effects on the normalized profits of 
independent base good and complementary good monopolists. Values of 
/Bd d   are in column 1 of Table 7.6 and values of /Cd d   in 
column2.23 Second, the effect of increasing normalized network effects on 
the normalized profits of the joint monopolist is assessed. Values of 
/Bd d   are in column 3 and values of /Cd d   are in column 4 of Table 
7.6 and the effect on the total normalized profits of the joint monopolist is the 
sum of the two columns. Each row of Table 7.6 provides the effect at a given 
   
Table 7.5 Effect of quality increases on profits 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4444 0.0000 -0.1852 0.2870 
0 2 0.3270 0.0366 -0.0571 0.2194 0.4444 0.0000 -0.1482 0.2593 
0 3 0.3675 0.0199 -0.0816 0.2298 0.4444 0.0000 -0.1358 0.2541 
0 4 0.3934 0.0124 -0.1030 0.2357 0.4444 0.0000 -0.1296 0.2523 
0 5 0.4110 0.0084 -0.1193 0.2394 0.4444 0.0000 -0.1259 0.2515 
0.4 1 0.2302 0.0587 -0.0441 0.2203 0.4603 -0.0335 -0.2282 0.3061 
0.4 2 0.3065 0.0259 -0.0796 0.2306 0.4343 -0.0083 -0.1676 0.2641 
0.4 3 0.3472 0.0142 -0.1061 0.2368 0.4259 -0.0037 -0.1475 0.2563 
0.4 4 0.3724 0.0089 -0.1262 0.2405 0.4218 -0.0021 -0.1376 0.2535 
0.4 5 0.3894 0.0060 -0.1418 0.2429 0.4193 -0.0013 -0.1316 0.2523 
 
Notes: (a) n.a. means at the corner solution derivatives not defined. (b) IF = Independent Firms, JM = Joint Monopolist. 
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combination of normalized network effects and quality levels. For example, 
row two of the table indicates that at normalized complementary good quality 
of 3Cq   and normalized network effects of 0.2  , a marginal increase in 
compatibility (normalized network effects) increases the normalized profits 
of the independent base good monopolist by 0.3644, the independent 
complementary good monopolist by 0.1853, the normalized base good profits 
of the joint monopolist by 0.3939 and the normalized complementary good 
profits of the joint monopolist by 0.1284. 
Comparing the sum of columns 3 and 4 to columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.6, 
observe that normalized profits are more sensitive to normalized network 
effects for a joint monopolist than for either independent monopolist. When 
network effects are greater, the value goes up both to consumers of the base 
good and to consumers of the complementary good. The value of the base 
good goes up directly because of the network effects. The value to 
complementary goods consumers goes up because they must buy the base 
good to use the complementary good and therefore also benefit indirectly 
from the increased network effects. This is why /Bd d   and /Cd d   
are both positive for the independent monopolists (columns 1 and 2 of Table 
7.6). In fact, the complementary good monopolist receives substantial 
benefits from the increase of network effects. However, because each of the 
independent firms does not take fully into consideration the effect they have 
on each other, their individual incentives to make their products more 
compatible are lower than the incentive of the joint monopolist to make its 
two products more compatible with other firms’ goods. Since consumers of 
both the base and complementary goods benefit, the joint monopolist 
captures both benefits, while in the case of the independent monopolists this 
benefit is shared between the two firms. 
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Table 7.6 Effects of the intensity of network effects on profits 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Normalized   
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0.1 3 0.3260 0.1776 0.3606 0.1214 
0.2 3 0.3644 0.1853 0.3939 0.1284 
0.3 3 0.4089 0.1900 0.4301 0.1352 
0.4 3 0.4620 0.1892 0.4698 0.1415 
0.5 3 0.5255 0.1807 0.5145 0.1461 
0.6 3 0.6024 0.1615 0.5666 0.1470 
0.7 3 0.6941 0.1300 0.6304 0.1412 
0.8 3 0.7979 0.0879 0.7131 0.1231 
0.9 3 0.9045 0.0416 0.8266 0.0831 
0.1 5 0.3116 0.1999 0.3475 0.1319 
0.2 5 0.3461 0.2098 0.3820 0.1354 
0.3 5 0.3866 0.2170 0.4207 0.1380 
0.4 5 0.4347 0.2199 0.4641 0.1393 
0.5 5 0.4931 0.2158 0.5137 0.1386 
0.6 5 0.5651 0.2009 0.5716 0.1343 
0.7 5 0.6541 0.1714 0.6413 0.1242 
0.8 5 0.7613 0.1249 0.7282 0.1042 
0.9 5 0.8815 0.0644 0.8419 0.0673 
Notes: IF = Independent Firms, JM = Joint Monopolist. 
 
 
PRICING OF WINDOWS AND OFFICE 
 
A puzzle of the Microsoft antitrust case is that Microsoft was charging a price 
for its Windows operating system significantly lower than most economic 
models predict (e.g., Direct Testimony of Schmalensee in United States v. 
Microsoft (1999) at paragraph 163). At the same time, Microsoft was selling 
the Microsoft Office suite of applications24 at a significantly higher price than 
Windows, even though Microsoft’s market share was comparable in the 
Windows and Office markets.25 At the time of the antitrust trial, Microsoft 
sold the majority of Windows and Office units through original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs). While precise OEM price data is proprietary and 
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difficult to obtain, estimates of the Office to Windows price ratio are in the 
range of 1.4 to 3.75.26 Explanations of the price difference no not explain the 
low relative Windows price except for the possibility of very strong potential 
competition in the operating systems market (see Economides 2001). 
Four main failing explanations have been offered. The first explanation is 
that Microsoft was keeping the price of Windows low to increase network 
effects, allowing it to possibly increase its price in the future. This 
explanation is unsatisfying given that Microsoft continued pricing Windows 
low even after it had gained a very high market share. A second possible 
explanation is that the existing installed base of Windows constrained 
Microsoft’s pricing because consumers who bought a new computer would 
uninstall Windows from their old computer and install it on the new one. 
However, Microsoft’s licensing requirements and the sheer complexity of 
uninstalling the operating system make it almost impossible for a user to 
uninstall a Windows operating system that was pre-installed by a computer 
hardware manufacturer and move it to a different (presumably new) 
computer. Moreover, typically, U.S. users who buy Windows pre-installed on 
their new computer are not given software that would allow them to install 
Windows to a different computer.27 So it is unlikely that the Windows 
installed base constrained the Windows price. A third possible explanation is 
that since computer systems (hardware and software) are durable, pricing of 
new versions of Windows is constrained by the availability of old computer 
system versions (including Windows). However, very rapid technological 
change in hardware has prompted consumers to buy new computers much 
faster than traditional obsolescence rates would imply and Windows was only 
a small part of the price of a new personal computer. Thus, it is unlikely that 
durability was a significant factor constraining the price of Windows. A 
fourth possible explanation is that the price of Windows is constrained by the 
possibility of consumers pirating the software. Although pirating of both 
Microsoft Office and Windows would have the same effect, it is more 
difficult to pirate Windows. Therefore, piracy issues do not explain the price 
difference between Windows and Microsoft Office. 
Another explanation that has been proposed and dismissed in the context 
of pure monopoly models for Windows and Microsoft Office (see 
Economides 2001) is that Microsoft kept the price of Windows low because 
this allowed Microsoft to charge more for complementary goods, such as 
Microsoft Office, that it produces. In the context of pure monopoly models 
for Windows and Microsoft Office, this explanation was insufficient to 
explain the very different prices charged for Windows and Office. In contrast, 
the model, in which a joint monopolist sets prices of the base and 
complementary goods in the presence or absence of network effects from 
direct consumption externalities or other complementary goods, is able to 
explain the relative prices of Windows and Office. 
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Model 4 is applied, with Windows as the base good and Microsoft Office 
as the complementary good.28 Using equations (7.20) and (7.21), the ratio of 
prices in Model 4 can be expressed analytically as 
 
3 1
4 2
C C
CB
B B
p q
R
p q
   . (7.25) 
 
Ratios of the price of Office to the price of Windows reported during the 
Microsoft antitrust trial can be explained as equilibrium of the model. Ratios 
of 1.4 to 3.75 for the price of Office relative to Windows reported in the 
Microsoft antitrust trial require 76 17
30 3
C
B
q
q
  .29 The equilibrium of Model 4 
also implies  
 
3
4 6
C B
B C
x q
x q
  , (7.26) 
 
from (7.20) and (7.21). The actual relative sales ratio of Microsoft Office and 
Windows can be used to infer the underlying relative qualities of the two 
goods and the equilibrium price ratio they imply. To determine the relative 
sales of Word and Office we obtained survey data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Supplement on Computer and Internet Use from 
September 2001.30 The survey asked the following questions about 
spreadsheet and word processors for both home and office use: (a) Do you 
use the computer at home (at the office) for word processing or desktop 
publishing?; or (b) Do you use the computer at home (at the office) for 
spreadsheets or databases? 
Assuming that respondents answer ‘yes’ to using a word processor either 
at work or at home used a word processor and similarly for spreadsheets. 
Accordingly, respondents are assumed to use either a word processor or a 
spreadsheet (there are no questions relating to use of presentation or database 
software) owned an office suite.31 Since only respondents who owned a 
computer answered either of these two questions, dividing the number of 
respondents we defined as owning an office suite by the number of 
respondents would yield office suite owners as a fraction of operating system 
(OS) owners (since computers and operating systems are purchased in fixed 
proportions) or: 
 
Office owners Microsoft Office + non-Microsoft Office Owners= .
OS owners Windows OS + non-Windows OS Owners
 (7.27) 
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From the survey, we obtained a fraction of 0.82 for this ratio. Since, 
 
Microsoft Office owners=
Windows OS owners
C
B
x
x
 (7.28) 
 
the numerator of (7.27) must be adjusted by Microsoft’s share in the Office 
suite market and the denominator of (7.27) by Microsoft’s share in the 
operating system market so that to obtain: 
 
Microsoft Office share= 0.82 .
Windows OS share
C
B
x
x
  (7.29) 
 
At the time of the antitrust trial, the market share of Windows among 
personal computers was estimated to be between 95 per cent and 97 per cent, 
while Microsoft Office’s share among office suites was estimated to be 95 
per cent. This implies the ratio of Microsoft Office to Microsoft Windows 
sales in (7.29) is between 0.80 and 0.82. Using (7.26) this yields a normalized 
quality ratio of between 2.38 and 3.14 and, using (7.25) a price ratio of 
between 1.29 and 1.85, which is at the lower end of the range estimated 
during the trial. 
It is interesting to compare the ratios of these prices under the two 
different market structures. Table 7.7 displays the normalized relative 
complementary good price obtained at given normalized quality levels for the 
joint monopolist (Model 4) versus independent firms (Model 2). Since Model 
2 cannot be solved analytically, we have displayed these results numerically. 
Except at low normalized quality levels of Office, a joint monopolist (such as 
Microsoft) has a higher normalized relative complementary good price than if 
an independent firm controlled Office. Microsoft, as a joint monopolist, 
internalizes the complementary good profits and therefore prefers to keep the 
price of the base good low so as to not choke off the positive feedback with 
those complementary goods that Microsoft does not produce, while pricing 
the complementary good relatively high to benefit from sales to those with 
high demand for Office. If, on the other hand, an independent firm were to 
sell Office, Microsoft can only benefit from sales of those with high demand 
for Office by increasing the price of Windows. If the normalized quality of 
Office is sufficiently low, then it is more important for the joint monopolist to 
capture profits from the base good and it is priced relatively high, but for 
reasonably high-normalized quality levels of the complementary good, the 
base good monopolist has an incentive to keep the base good price relatively 
low. 
Davis et al. (1999) show that a monopolist selling a base and 
complementary good can have an incentive to price the complementary good  
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Table 7.7 Complementary to base good price ratio, joint monopolist   
    versus independent firms 
 
Normalized Complementary 
Good Quality  
C
C
B
qq
q
   
  
Normalized Relative Price 
of Complementary Good 
C
CB
B
pR
p
   
  
JM IF 
   
1 0.2500 0.7071 
2 1.0000 1.2292 
3 1.7500 1.7375 
4 2.5000 2.2417 
5 3.2500 2.7439 
6 4.0000 3.2455 
7 4.7500 3.7465 
8 5.5000 4.2472 
9 6.2500 4.7477 
10 7.0000 5.2482 
 
lower than the base good. They assume a linear demand function for each 
good and that each product’s demand depends negatively on the other good 
price. The goods have symmetric demand except for the intercept and the 
base good has the bigger demand. Given this setup, the monopolist prices the 
base good higher than the complementary good, the opposite of the current 
finding. The intuition for the Davis et al. result is that the monopolist wants 
to price the base good relatively high to garner greater demand while pricing 
the complementary good relatively low so as to not choke off demand for the 
good. In current modelling, the monopolist does not is not concerned about 
choking off demand for the base good if it sets a relatively high price for the 
complementary good as consumers who place a low value on the 
complementary good simply purchase only the base good. The monopolist 
can set the price instruments independently. Davis et al., on the other hand, 
can be viewed as a representative agent model. Since the representative 
consumer purchases units of both goods, demand for the base good is always 
negatively affected by the price of the complementary good. 
 
 
RELATION TO THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
This section demonstrates that the model can be used to simulate and 
calibrate results from the empirical literature estimating pricing effects of 
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complementary goods and network effects. The model could thus be used to 
estimate counterfactuals in these situations, sometimes with extensions to our 
model. To allow calibration to the empirical data, we introduce an intercept 
term into the utility consumers obtain from the base and complementary 
goods. Specifically: 
 
B B B BU k q p x V        
 
and 
 
C C CV k q p   , 
 
where Bk  and Ck  are constants and represent the baseline utility that the 
lowest type consumer obtains from purchasing the goods. Thus, our earlier 
theoretical results assume that the baseline utility obtained from each good is 
zero for both goods. 
Gandal et al. (2000) estimate a structural model of adoption of CD players 
and complementary CD titles to determine the magnitude of network effects. 
Using data on the number of titles and CD players sold between 1985 and 
1992, the authors find that the elasticity of the number of CD titles with 
respect to CD player sales is 0.56 while the elasticity of CD player sales with 
respect to the number of CD titles available is 0.033. This does not exactly 
correspond to the current setup since there are multiple complementary 
goods; however, total sales of CDs can be treated as a composite good to 
apply this framework. 
Model 2 is calibrated to these results, as Model 2 is appropriate since firms 
selling CD players generally differ from those selling CD titles. Assuming 
that the base good corresponds to CD players and the complementary good to 
CD titles, the equilibrium quantities of the base ( )Bx  and complementary 
( )Cx  goods are found at given normalized quality level ( )Cq  and normalized 
utility intercepts32 (defined as /C C Bk k q  and /B B Bk k q ). Increasing the 
complementary good normalized utility intercept to Ck   results in the 
equilibrium quantity of the complementary ( )Cx  and base goods ( )Bx . Also, 
increasing the complementary good normalized utility intercept simulates an 
increase in sales of the complementary good. Computing the elasticity of 
base good sales with respect to complementary good sales: 
( ) / (( ) )BC B B C C C Bx x x x x x     , provides the elasticity of complementary 
good sales with respect to base good sales in a similar manner by increasing 
the base good normalized utility intercept to Bk  (while holding Ck  constant) 
and calculating ( ) / (( ) )CB C C B B B Cx x x x x x     . 
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At 0.3Bk  , 0.1Ck  , and 2Cq  , 0.018BC   and 0.319CB   are 
obtained (which are close to the empirical results). At these values, 
1.071CBR  , normalized profits of the base good monopolist are 0.587 and 
normalized profits of the complementary good monopolist are 0.462. Once 
calibrated, various counterfactuals can be performed. For example, the sales, 
prices and profits of CD players and CD titles resulting from a merger of CD 
player and CD title manufacturers could be simulated by evaluating Model 4 
at these parameter values. The effect of increased title variety could be 
examined by increasing   and solving for the new equilibrium, while 
increases in CD player quality (relative to CD quality) could be simulated by 
decreasing Cq  and solving for the new equilibrium. 
Gandal (1995) estimates a hedonic model of personal computer database 
management systems (DBMS) software pricing. Using data on all major 
products offered from 1989 to 1991, Gandal estimates the value of a DBMS 
being compatible with the Lotus spreadsheet, the dominant spreadsheet at the 
time. Compatibility with the Lotus standard meant that the DBMS could 
export files in a Lotus-compatible format. Gandal finds that DBMS products 
compatible with the Lotus standard had a 31 per cent higher price relative to 
incompatible DBMS’s, controlling for other quality variables. 
To simulate this using again Model 2 (since the DBMS’s and Lotus 
spreadsheet were produced by separate firms) and assume that the base good 
is a DBMS and the complementary good is the Lotus spreadsheet. First, the 
equilibrium normalized relative complementary price ( )CBR  is found at a 
given normalized quality level ( )Cq . Then increasing the normalized quality 
to Cq  the new equilibrium normalized relative complementary good price 
( )CBR  allowing the quantity to adjust optimally is obtained. Finally, the 
elasticity of the complementary good price with respect to the 
complementary good quality is: ( ) / (( ) )Pq CB CB C C C CBR R q q q R         . The 
mode is not calibrated to the empirical results in this case since the quality 
improvement equivalent to compatibility with the Lotus standard cannot be 
measured. However, at 0B Ck k    and 2Cq  , 1.075Pq  . 
There are several papers which estimate the pricing effects of 
complementary goods and network effects but would require incorporating 
dynamic effects in the model. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) estimate a 
hedonic model of personal computer spreadsheet pricing on products sold 
between 1987 and 1992. The authors estimate the elasticity of the spreadsheet 
price with respect to the size of the spreadsheet’s installed base. Ohashi 
(2003) uses a random-coefficients discrete choice model to estimate the 
importance of indirect network effects in the standards battle between the 
Beta and VHS formats in the U.S. videocassette recorder market between 
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1978 and 1996. Ohashi estimates elasticities of market share with respect to 
the installed base of recorders. Park (2003) estimates indirect network effects 
in the VCR market. The author estimates the response of one format’s 
network ‘advantage’ (relative strength of its network) to relative sales in each 
period. 
Application to two other papers would involve extending the model to 
consider multiple competing base goods. Dranove and Gandal (2003) test for 
indirect network effects in the DVD market and the extent to which pre-
announcement of the competing DIVX technology slowed adoption. Since 
the DVD format was an open standard, multiple studios were deciding 
whether to issue films in the DVD format. Nair et al. (2004) estimate indirect 
network effects in the market for personal digital assistants (PDAs). In this 
case, the market includes two competing base good (PDA) firms and many 
software (complementary) good providers. Finally, Rysman (2004) uses a 
structural model to estimate the indirect network effects between consumer 
usage (measured by number of references per household per month from 
surveys) and quantity of advertisements in the yellow pages directory market. 
Approximately 41 per cent of these markets have a single publisher so that 
the model can be calibrated in these monopoly markets. However, to do so 
would require a model of advertising demand to appropriately model the 
price of consumer advertising usage. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A model is solved with two goods, a base good and a complementary good 
whose use requires the base good, for two alternative industry structures, 
joint monopoly and two independent monopolists. This is related to a model 
with network effects summarized in the consumers’ utility functions and find 
the appropriate parameter values for network effects that produce the same 
equilibrium results. The effect of changes in the inherent quality of the base 
and complementary goods are assessed and equate them to increases in the 
intensity of network effects required to maintain the same base good profits. 
Also, the incentive to invest, in either the base or complementary good 
quality and product compatibility is evaluated. Finally, an economically 
rational explanation of Microsoft’s relative pricing of Windows and Office is 
provided with a demonstration of how the model can be calibrated to 
empirical network effects studies to perform counterfactuals. 
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NOTES 
 
1. The model is an example of a micro model as defined by Economides (1996a) or the 
components approach as defined by Shy (2001). 
2. The approach does not consider the more distantly related effect of changes in software 
variety considered in Church and Gandal (1992) or Chou and Shy (1990). The former 
evaluate how the compatibility decisions of software firms affect the degree of 
standardization in the hardware market, while the latter demonstrate that increasing returns 
in the production of complementary goods can substitute for the assumption of network 
effects. This paper attempts to take network effects and a complementary good as given 
and evaluate their equivalence. 
3. This is an example of a ‘macro’ model as defined by Economides (1996a) or the ‘network 
externalities approach’ as defined by Shy (2001). 
4. Since the complementary good requires the presence of the base good but not conversely, it 
is expected that the equilibria in terms of prices and quantities will be asymmetric across 
firms. 
5. Assume that that the influence of positive consumption (network) effects on the willingness 
to pay for the base good can be summarized by an additive term which is proportional to 
sales of the base good. This assumes that higher sales of the base good are reflected in 
higher sales of other complementary goods and vice versa. 
6. This specification requires Bq   for demand to be download sloping. 
7. While the model assumes zero costs, positive costs could easily be added. That is, 
/ ( 2 ) / ( ) 0B B B B Bd dp q p q      and 2 2/ 2 / ( ) 0B B Bd dp q      since Bq  . 
8. Also the model requires that everyone does not buy the good which implies 1Bx
   or 
2( )B Bq q  , i.e., / 2Bq  . 
9. The second-order conditions are (3 2 ) / 0B C B Cp p q q    and 2 / 0Cq   respectively, 
both of which are met for all parameter values. 
10. Note that the first-order conditions place no restrictions on the relative qualities. The 
positive root of the first first-order condition is 21 / 3( 2 4 6 )C C B Cp p q q    which is 
always positive. Solving the second first-order condition for Cp  gives 
2/ 2 / 4C B Bq p q  
which is always positive. 
11. Also verified numerically is that the nonlinear second-order conditions hold and that 
( ; )nB B Cp p   is quasi-concave in Bp  and ( ; )nC C Bp p   is quasi-concave in Cp . 
12. The second-order condition is met as the Hessian is negative definite for all parameter 
values. 
13. Also notice that, for independent firms, the first-order conditions cannot be decomposed as 
in joint monopoly, and therefore the equilibrium prices of both the base and 
complementary good do depend on the quality levels of both goods. For independent firms, 
the first-order conditions are: 
(A) 0B B B C B CD p D D p D     , 
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(B)  0B B B C B CD p D D p D     . 
Substitution from (B) into (A) cannot accomplish decomposition as in joint monopoly. Of 
course, comparison of (B) with (22) confirms Cournot’s result that the total price B Cp p  
is lower under joint monopoly. 
14. Although in principle the joint monopolist could choose to sell the complementary good 
below cost, such action could raise serious antitrust concerns. 
15. Also verified is that the second-order conditions are met. The conditions are solved over a 
grid of possible prices to ensure that the global maximum is obtained. 
16. The possibility of anti-competitive leveraging of monopoly power from the base to the 
complementary good is not discussed. 
17. As shown in general in Note 13, the sum of the prices B Cp p  is lower for the joint 
monopolist than for the independent monopolists. 
18. Also observed is that the  ’s are neither consistently higher or lower for the joint 
monopolist relative to the independent firms. At high levels of complementary good quality 
the independent firms’  -equivalent is greater, while at low quality levels the opposite is 
true. 
19. All modern computer operating systems contain a functions useful to applications 
developers but typically not directly useful to end-users. For example, Windows has timing 
functions that are useful to applications developers and have no direct functional value to 
end-users and built-in abilities to print to a variety of printers, a necessary capability for 
applications. 
20. The demand equation for the complementary good firm simplifies to 
1 / / 2C C C B B Cx p q p q   . 
21. The base good monopolist’s incentives based could be evaluated on total rather than 
marginal profits but this would require specifying the cost structure for quality 
improvements. The results would thus depend arbitrarily on the functional form of the cost 
function. Also the base good monopolist’s incentives could be evaluated based on base and 
complementary goods profits rather than just base good profits. However, the objective is 
instead to assess the base good monopolist’s incentive beyond that provided by 
complementary good profits alone since these incentives would be the same for both a joint 
monopolist and an independent firm facing the same cost structure and in the absence of 
complementarities. 
22. Derivatives are calculated using Richardson extrapolation (see, Acton 1990, p. 106) with a 
step-size of one per cent of Bq  or Cq . 
23. Derivatives are calculated using Richardson extrapolation with step-size of one per cent of 
 . 
24. Microsoft Office typically includes Word (word processor); Excel spreadsheet; PowerPoint 
presentations tool; Outlook personal information management tool; and Access database. 
25. The marginal cost of Windows and Office are near zero and almost the same since neither 
ships with paper manuals, and are generally preloaded by OEMs on computers at this time. 
26. See e.g., ‘Some Experts Blame Rising Software Prices on Microsoft,’ PCWorld.com. 
27. U.S. users are typically given a recovery CD that allows them to restore the particular 
computer model they own, including Windows, to the original condition when it was 
shipped from the factory. Such a CD is unable to install Windows on any other computer 
model. 
28. The case of zero network effects 0   is presented for brevity. The same result holds for 
positive network effects ( 0)   using Models 3 and 5. 
29. See Direct Testimony Schmalensee in United States v. Microsoft (1999) at paragraph 163 
and footnote 164. 
30. See http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ for details. 
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31. Although consumers could have purchased stand-alone word processor or spreadsheet 
software this was rare by 2001. 
32. Model 2 is ‘scalable’ in , ,B C Bk k q  and Cq  in the sense that multiplying all four by a 
factor   leaves sales of both goods unaffected and the normalized price unchanged. 
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